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Abstract
The decision to donate blood and living organs is considered voluntary and
altruistic. However, the shortage of donors has opened an interesting debate in
recent years, considering offering economic incentives to donors. This paper ana-
lyzes theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives over individuals when
facing the decision of becoming donors. Results show that crowding-in of blood
donors would be more likely by offering “Information concerning blood donations”
or “Blood Tests”. In both, blood and living organ donations, “Money” would be
very likely to crowd-out individuals from donating. Concerning living organs, we
do not find good evidence for crowding-in. We conclude donation policies, properly
designed, could help to increase the number of donors, and more specifically suggest
implementing non-monetary incentives.
Keywords: Social preferences, Incentives, Altruism, Blood and Living Organ Do-
nations
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1 Introduction
Blood and living organ donations are voluntary and altruistic. Donation in these cases
is somehow particular, as individuals who donate are not expecting a compensation for
donating (Fortin et al., 2010), but donate for altruistic reasons.
Blood cannot be artificially created and there is an increasing need of organs for
transplantation. Evidence shows that even if all the deceased donors actually donate,
unfortunately this would not be enough to cover the growing demand for organs (Israni
et al., 2005) and, as a consequence, the waiting lists do not stop increasing. Encouraging
blood and living organ donations is therefore necessary.
The effect of introducing incentives for pro-social activities has been analyzed by
prestigious researchers, not only in the field of economics, but is also popular in psy-
chology, sociology and other fields. Recently researchers concluded that incentives do
influence social values, and also that social preferences are important influences on in-
dividuals’ behavior (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Bowles and Polan´ıa, 2012). However,
there is not a common agreement about HOW they influence behavior and this is the
question that has motivated this paper.
Behind this question is the Motivation Crowding Theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey
and Jegen, 2001). This theory of crowding-effects stipulates a systematic interaction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, both influencing human behavior. For instance,
this theory predicts that external interventions, via economic incentives or punishments,
may undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey and Jegen, 2001). How-
ever, experimental studies have demonstrated that there is not a generalized behavior
towards incentives. It cannot be said that incentives always discourage pro-social activ-
ities.
The debate was introduced by Richard Titmuss (1971), who analyzed the effect
of introducing economic incentives for donating blood. He concluded that economic
incentives crowd-out (expel) more blood donors than they crowd-in (attract). According
to this author, this may be due to the partial destruction of intrinsic motivation when
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price mechanisms are introduced. But some researchers (Solow, 1971; Arrow, 1972;
Bliss, 1972), attracted by these findings, reviewed Titmuss work discovering that results
were not enough to conclude that incentives crowd-out blood donors.
Economic incentives sometimes may reduce the total supply (Frey and Oberholzer,
1997). However, other studies analyzing the introduction of incentives in the market for
live and cadaveric organ donations (Becker and El´ıas, 2007) demonstrate that monetary
incentives could increase the supply of organs for transplantation and even reduce the
waiting lists for an organ. In the context of blood and living organ donations, Lacetera
and Macis (2010) showed that some individuals, especially those who recently became
donors, did not show aversion to direct cash incentives, while women -especially among
active or regular donors- reported aversion to cash incentives. They concluded that
offering monetary payments a high proportion of active donors would stop donating.
However, other kind of incentives, like vouchers (indirect cash of the same nominal value
than the monetary incentive) were better supported, and in another experiment they
showed that symbolic incentives such as medals or publishing the name of donors in the
journal where better motivators (Lacetera and Macis, 2008). In addition, other authors,
in a field experiment, compare the effect of lottery tickets versus a free cholesterol test,
showing that the lottery tickets significantly increased blood donations (Goette and
Stutzer, 2009).
For some individuals, incentives may be perceived as signals of permissible behavior
(Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008), provide information about the policy makers or in
general about the person who implements the incentive (Fehr et al., 2007; Irlenbusch
and Ruchala, 2008; Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009); some of them even could adapt
their preferences to incentives (Bowles and Polan´ıa, 2010) or may react positively to
incentives, and accept them as a compensation of a socially beneficial action adapting
theirs preferences. But there is also evidence of crowding-in when using incentives, some
individuals being attracted by the incentive (Falk, Ga¨chter and Kovacs, 1999; Ga¨chter
and Falk, 2002; Lacetera and Macis, 2010).
The risk of existence of crowding-out suggests that, in some circumstances, it is
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advisable not to use the market model to elicit a higher supply as sometimes incentives
can have an effect which is the contrary to the one predicted by the conventional economic
theory, according to which incentives increase supply. In such cases, and this could be
the case of blood and living organ donations, it is recommended not to rely on monetary
payments but on a different type of incentive (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Certain incentives
could attract some self-regarding individuals who suddenly will be willing to become
donors. For example, mechanisms based on information –sometimes called exhortation
mechanisms– could be effective increasing individuals’ willingness to donate (Thorne,
1998). The final result, net crowding-in or crowding out, depends on the type of incentive
(monetary or non-monetary), the nature of the task to perform (individual/private versus
social/public decisions), and on characteristics of the population involved (altruistic or
self-interested).
We aim to analyze how incentives can influence behavior and decision making, specif-
ically social preferences. We center this question, and focus on the specific context of
blood and living organ donations. We analyze how individuals’ behavior may be in-
fluenced by incentives, monetary and non-monetary, using theoretical approach and
empirical research. From a policy making perspective, we look for the best incentive in
case of being implemented, maximizing the gap between attracted and dissuaded indi-
viduals. We would be happy to suggest, according to our results, some incentive that
would attract new donors at the same time that minimizes the crowding-out of active
donors.
A theoretical model analyzes the crowding effects of incentives looking at the changes
in individuals’ utility when incentives are offered. The model is general for both kinds
of donations. We assume that behind the decision of becoming or not a blood or living
organs are social preferences. This means that individuals are not only self-interested
but are also concerned about the others’ payoffs (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni,
1990). Altruism, reciprocity or intrinsic pleasures in helping others are some examples
of social preferences.
Empirically, we explore the agreement/disagreement with different incentive mecha-
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nisms in a population of blood donors and staff from a university population.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we study, through a model of expected
utility, how incentives could affect individuals’ behavior. We analyze the motivation
crowding effects and provide the model results. In section 3 we present the questionnaire
on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations, and analyze, through descriptive
statistics and regression models, the relationship between incentives and individuals’
willingness to donate blood or living organs. Section 4 opens a discussion and the paper
concludes in section 5 where we comment the most relevant aspects and results of this
study, and mention the implications for future research or public policies.
2 The Model
Denote by I = 1, . . . , n the set of individuals who face the decision of becoming or not
blood/living organ donors, and J = 1, . . . ,m the set of potential recipients (that is, the
total number of individuals waiting for a transfusion or an organ transplantation of a
kidney or a liver in a population of size P ).
It can be observed that the number of individuals waiting for a transfusion or for
an organ is strictly higher than the number of donors. This implies that the number of
donors is lower than the number of existing recipients in the waiting lists for a transfusion
or transplantation. Therefore, offering incentives to reduce the gap between supply and
demand makes sense. Otherwise incentives will not be necessary.
We also assume that individuals do not decide only once to become or not donors,
but they make the decision several times in their time horizon t = A, . . . , A + Li. The
time horizon goes from the first time the individual decides if he/she is willing to become
or not a donor (t = A, where A is the age of the individual at that time) until the last
time the individual makes such a decision. The individual may stop to be willing to
donate anymore or may be asked to stop donating because of age or health reasons at
time t = A+ Li. However, this will not change any of the model results.
We propose a utility function for any individual i ∈ I who faces the decision of
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becoming or not a donor at time t. The expected utility of becoming a donor is a function
of the following arguments: the consumption of goods and services, the expected costs
and benefits for donating, and the external intervention (the incentive).
Ui,t := Ui,t
(
Xi,t, Ci,t, Si,t, Gi,t, Uj,t
)
(1)
The first two arguments represent the consumption of goods and services, Xi, and
the expected costs of donation (Ci); Si represents the incentive, Gi represents the very
pleasure of giving, known as the “warm-glow” (Andreoni, 1990), and Uj the expected
utility for the recipient j ∈ J . We assume j is unknown in the case of blood donations,
and known in the case of living organ donations, focused the later on donation between
relatives only. The realization of each variable (measured by utility units) will be repre-
sented by small letters, representing the benefits and costs that an individual observes
at each time point.
We assume that individuals are in part self-interested so that they donate in part
by egotistic reasons such as pride or social acceptation, but also that in part they do-
nate because of altruistic reasons, such as the pleasure of the very fact of giving and
the expected health improvements for the recipient when receiving the donation. In
other words, individuals are defined by ”other-regarding preferences”. These models,
considering altruistic individuals, other-regarding behavior and social values, have been
analyzed previously in the literature (Becker, 1976, Simon, 1993, Bowles and Polan´ıa,
2012).
The model that we propose is, as far as we know, the first considering that, an
individual, when making a decision at a certain time point, considers not only the benefits
and costs at that time but also makes expectations about the future benefits and costs,
and these expectations also account for the decision of donating blood or living organs.
The standard assumption of temporal positive preferences is made, and therefore the
expected utility for donating at time t for the individual i is the discounted sum (the
sum is represented by the integral and is the discount factor) of the expected utility
along the time horizon. The following expression represents the expected utility of the
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decision of becoming a donor at any time point on the time horizon that goes from t = A
to t = A+ Li :
Ui,t(.) =
∫ A+Li
t
e−ρ·t ·
[
xi,t − ci,t + si,t + ai,t(S) ·
(
gi,t + u
βi
j,t
)
+ λi,t · sαi
]
dt, ∀t ≥ A (2)
where A represents the age of the individual at the first time facing such a decision and
Li is the last time and individual faces that decision (either voluntarily or compulsorily
for reasons of health or age); ai,t is the degree of altruism (ai,t ∈ R+) which is a function
of incentives, and λi,t the propensity (+) or aversion (−) to accept incentives for that
individual at that time, αi and βi are the elasticity of the utility of the i-individual from
incentives and from the utility of the recipient, respectively, and the discount factor ρ
indicates a positive depreciation of the total utility over the time.
Similar to other models in the literature (Bowles and Polan´ıa, 2010), we assume
altruism is a function of incentives. The difference is that we propose a non-linear
function, assuming that not all the units of the incentive S affect equally to the degree
of altruism. The function of altruism proposed is the following:
ai,t(S) = a0,i,t − bi,t · sΩi,ti,t (3)
We assume that a′s ≤ 0 , so that receiving positive quantities of an incentive S re-
duces the individuals’ degree of altruism from the initial degree of altruism. Only for
simplicity, lets’ give a value to parameters alpha and omega αi = Ωi = 2 , such that each
unit of incentive S provokes a reduction of the degree of altruism equal to a′s = −2 · b · s
, for b taking strictly positive values and with a random distribution in the support
b ∈ [b, b¯]. The function for the degree of altruism and the marginal effects of incentive
over that function is represented in figure 1 below. A result that is clear in that figure
is that the lower (higher) the value of parameters b and Ω, the higher (lower) is the
incentive that the individual would be willing to accept before the degree of altruism is
zero.
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Including the function proposed for the degree of altruism in the utility function, it
can be rewritten as follows:
Ui,t(.) =
∫ A+Li
t
e−ρ·t ·
[
xi,t − ci,t + si,t +
(
a0,i,t − bi,t · s2i,t
) · (gi,t + uβij,t)+ λi,t · s2]dt, ∀t ≥ A
(4)
Under the standard assumption that individuals are utility maximisers, they will decide
to become donors if and only if the expected utility of becoming a donor is positive higher
than the utility of deciding not to become a donor (U0i,t). For simplicity, we assume that
this utility is zero, U0i,t = 0.
2.1 Motivation Crowding Effects
We will focus first on analyzing all possible crowding-effects of incentives as variations
in the individual’s marginal and total utilities when incentives are offered.
The Motivation Crowding Effects are analyzed through the variations in the utility
for each additional unit of incentive. By offering an incentive S three different effects on
the marginal utility are possible:
• Crowding-in: for each additional unit of the incentive, utility increases in a higher
proportion. That is Us > 0 and Uss > 0.
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• Weak Crowding-out: for each additional unit of the incentive, utility increases in
a lower proportion. That is Us > 0 and Uss < 0
• Strong Crowding-out: for each additional unit of the incentive, the utility from
donating decreases (Us < 0).
Depending on the values of the parameters of the model, the individual would be
crowded-in or crowded-out. From the model, we can get the expression for the marginal
utility from the incentive, which is:
Us = e
−ρ·t ·
[
1− 2 · bi,t · si,t · (gi,t + uβij,t) + 2 · λi,t · si,t
]∣∣∣∣
t=Li
(5)
Making that expression equal to zero we find the threshold incentive, s∗, for any indi-
vidual.
s∗ =
1
2 ·
[
bi,t · (gi,t + uβij )− λi
] (6)
It can be deduced from this result that the optimal incentive for individuals who are
averse to incentives is lower than for individuals who are more prone to incentives (all
the rest of the parameters being equal for both individuals).
s∗λi>0 > s
∗
λi<0 (7)
This result can be generalized as it is done in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: For any pair of individuals {1, 2} ∈ I with the same values of b, g,
uβij :
• If individuals have propensity to incentives, so that λ > 0, it is true that those
individuals with higher propensity would accept higher quantities of the incentive:
s∗λ1 ≥ s∗λ2 ⇔ λ1 ≥ λ2
• If individual 1 has propensity to incentives and individual 2 is averse, it is true
that the first will accept a higher quantity of the incentive than the second.
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• If both individuals have aversion to incentives, and for the individual 1 more averse
than the individual 2, the first individual would accept lower quantities of the
incentive: s∗λ1 ≤ s∗λ2 ⇔ λ1 ≤ λ2
Also, according equation 6, the higher the value of b, the lower the incentive that would
be accepted. This result leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2: For any pair of individuals {1, 2} ∈ I with the same values of λ, g,
uβij , if individual 1 has a higher value of b than individual 2, being stronger the negative
effect of incentives over the degree of altruism, the maximum incentive that individual
1 will be willing to accept is smaller than the incentive that individual 2 will accept.
Proof for propositions 1 and 2: We can write the expressions for the disutility of an
individual who is propense (equation 8) or averse (equation 9) to incentives as follows:
∆−Ui|S>0 =
∫ A+Li
t
e−ρ·t ·
[
− b · sΩ · (g + uβj )
]
dt (8)
∆−Ui|S>0 =
∫ A+Li
t
e−ρ·t ·
[
− b · sΩ · (g + uβj ) + λ · sΩ
]
dt,∀λ < 0 (9)
As the disutility for the individual who has aversion to incentives is higher than the
disutility of incentives for the individual who has propensity to incentives, for the same
quantity of incentive the individual who is averse has a stronger disutility. Therefore,
the incentive that makes total utility equal to zero is smaller for the individual who has
aversion to incentives. The same proof can be made for both individuals being averse,
and for both individuals who are propense, in this case by showing the utility gains
instead of disutility.
Proposition 2 is demonstrated as follows: the higher the value of b the higher the
disutility of the incentive. For two individuals who show either propensity or aversion
to incentives, the disutility of the individual who has a higher value of b is higher, and
therefore, the incentive that is going to tolerate as maximum will be smaller.
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3 Empirical Work
In a broad questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations (see
Cabase´s, Errea; Working Paper, 2011) we include some questions on incentives for blood
and living organ donations. The aim is to find the different perception that blood and
non-blood donors and individuals with different willingness to donate living organs have
concerning a list of incentives.
3.1 Data Collection
Data were collected between June and December 2010. Two different formats of the same
questionnaire were distributed: a pen and pencil questionnaire to a selected population of
500 blood donors (n1 = 210 is the number of questionnaires finally recruited, representing
the 42% of the initially contacted), and an online questionnaire to the 2000 members of
the staff community at the Public University of Navarre (n2 = 282 questionnaires finally
recruited from the university population, around the 15%). We finally have a total of
N = 492 questionnaires recruited.
3.2 The Questionnaire
In those questions which refer to incentives, individuals may choose their level of agree-
ment/disagreement with each of the incentives. We propose a 4-leveled likert scale, from
“Completely Agree” to “Completely disagree”. Individuals have also a NA (not answer)
fifth choice.
We mix monetary, non-monetary and exhortation incentives in order to compare
individuals’ preferences for the different kinds of incentives. We also want to explore
the preferences over incentives for blood and non-blood donors, and for individuals who
would be willing to donate an organ in life and those who would not. The questionnaire
begins asking about pesonal information and characteristics that allow us to classify
individuals among blood/non-blood donors and other socio-demographic characteristics
such as age, education and other. In the block of questions concerning living organ
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donations a question on willingness to donate an organ in life to a relative helps to
classify individuals in this aspect.
We ask individuals to choose their agreement with the following incentives:
• For blood donations: some reward, fiscal deductions, university credits for stu-
dents, monetary payment, priority in health care, social recognition, information
on blood donations, and blood tests.
• For living organ donations: some reward, money, fiscal deductions, preference in
health care, and priority in the waiting list for an organ in the future.
The question made is ”How much would you agree/disagree with the incentive X?”.
Individuals have to choose a level of agreement/disagreement in a scale, for each of the
incentives.
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
Among our individuals, 318 are blood donors (a 64.63%) and 174 are not blood donors
(a 35.36%). We have to remark that from the blood donors there is a high proportion of
regular donors (218) and also the population of blood donors is very different from the
reality, as the percentage of donors in the spanish population is between 5% and 10%.
However, this was done purposely, in order to be able to describe and to analyze the
differences in preferences reported by blood and non-blood donors. The distribution of
individuals according to age and gender is similar to that of the general population in
Navarra in the same year that the data were collected, 2010.
Analyzing the responses given to incentives for blood donations, we find that there
is a higher proportion in disagreement than in agreement with offering “Any reward” to
blood donors. Individuals do not agree with fiscal deductions, university credits, mone-
tary rewards and priorization. Exhortation mechanisms seem more plausible, agreeing
individuals on the idea of rewarding blood donors by sending statistics on donations and
blood test after each donation process. Results are shown in Table 1.
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We checked the differences between blood and non-blood donors do not find strong dif-
ferences in their agreement with many of the incentives between blood and non-blood
donors, but only in a few of them, so results are the aggregation of answers from blood
and non-blood donors. Only answers given to social recognition and priority in health
care differ between both groups. Results suggest that for the non-blood donors, incen-
tives such as “priority in health” care and “social recognition” are better accepted than
for the blood donors, both of them achieving the 80% of the answers aggregating the two
levels of agreement. Concerning economic incentives, it is true that the majority of the
respondents show disagreement with “monetary payments”. However, the percentage
of individuals who agree with such an incentive is non-negligible among the non-blood
donors, being the 27%. Both, blood and non-blood donors, accumulate a higher percent-
age in the completely agree/some agree levels for the non-monetary incentives such as
“blood” tests and “information about blood donation”. The regression analysis in the
next section will provide reinforce this descriptive results by including some individual
characteristics in the regression models.
For the whole sample, according to the proportion of answers we can establish the
following order of preferences, from the most to the least preferred incentives:
Blood Tests  Information  Social Recognition  Priority in Health Care  Fiscal Deduc-
tions  Money
For the sample of Blood Donors the order remains equal than for the full sample. However,
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some slight differences can be observed for the sample of Non Blood Donors.
Blood Tests  Information  Social Recognition  Priority in Health Care  Money 
Fiscal Deductions
We cannot say that the ways blood and non blood donors order incentives are different, and
then, we can say that, in global for our population, Blood Tests are the incentives that would
report the highest utility to individuals, and money the lowest.
Concerning incentives for living organ donations (Table 2), we find that, in general, indi-
viduals agree on offering some reward to living organ donors. However, there is disagreement
with offering a monetary payment for these donations. Concerning fiscal deductions there is a
high disagreement but it cannot be ignored the sum of frequencies in levels 1 and 2 (completely
agree and some agree) which is not small, involving more than 30% of the respondents. The
incentive with the highest level of agreement is offering preference in the waiting lists for living
organ donors.
We observe in this case that individuals are more prone to accept Preferences in the waiting
lists, followed this incentive by Some Reward. The responses of individuals indicate the highest
proportion of disagreement when asking about Monetary payments, followed by Fiscal deductions
and Priority in Health Care.
3.4 Regression Analysis
We estimate ordered logit models (a different model for each of the incentives) in which the
dependent variable is the level of agreement with the incentive, and the independent variables are
individuals characteristics. Unconditional and conditional estimations will be shown separately
for blood and living organ donations.
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Concerning blood donations, we estimate one simple (equation 10) and one multiple ordered
logit model (equation 11), the latter conditioned to k individual’s characteristics Xi (being or
not a blood donor, gender, age, predecessors who donate among relatives or friends).
Y ∗i = α1 ·BDi + i (10)
Y ∗i = α1 ·BDi + αk ·Xi + i (11)
Where Y ∗i = Pr[Y = y] for y = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the independent variable BDi = {0, 1} takes
value 1 if the individual is a blood donor, and value 0 otherwise.
Similar regression analysis is made to explore the perception of incentives for living organ
donations: one simple and one conditional ordered logit model, conditioned to k individual’s
characteristics Xi (willingness to donate, gender, age, predecessors who donate among relatives
or friends, having an organ donor card).
Y ∗i = α1 ·WTDi + i (12)
Y ∗i = α1 ·WTDi + αk ·Xi + i (13)
Where the independent variable WTDi = {0, 1} takes value 1 if the individual is completely
willing to donate, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable Yi again takes four positive discrete
values: y = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where the responses are in ascending order of agreement, from 1=
Completely Disagree to 4=Completely Agree and level 5 for Not Applicable/Do not answer.
The aim is to calculate the probability of individuals, for each of the incentives and according
to certain individuals’ characteristics Xi, of belonging to each of the agreement levels. For the
case of blood donations, for each type of incentive, we can calculate after having estimated two
models: One to estimate differences between blood and non-blood donors, Pr[Y = y|BD] , and a
second model in which we condition not only to being or not a blood donor, but also we condition
to individual characteristics, Pr[Y = y|BD,X]. Similarly we calculate the associated probabil-
ities to the models estimated for the living organ donations’ case. This will give us a measure
of the risk of increasing the number of blood donors or encouraging individuals towards living
organ donations (crowding-in), as well as the probabilities of loosing or dissuading individuals
(crowding-out) from donating blood and living organs respectively.
3.5 Results of the Estimations
First regression model estimation results show that there are significant differences between blood
and non-blood donors in the agreement/disagreement with respect to the following incentives:
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some reward, university credits, money, social recognition, and blood tests. The sign of the
coefficients tell the increase (+) or decrease (−) in the probability of being completely agree
with that incentive for the blood donors with respect to the non-blood donors. We eliminate the
NA responses (level 5) and missing answers for the analysis. Results are shown in Table 3 below.
Blood donors have a lower probability than the non-blood donors of agreeing completely with
the idea of offering “some reward” to blood donors (P [Y = 4|BD = 1] = 0.11 < P [Y = 4|BD =
0] = 0.17) . The same effect is observed for “social recognition” and for ”money”, in which we
find specially a difference between blood and non-blood donors (notice that for blood donors
the probability of complete agreement is zero). On the contrary, blood donors have a higher
probability than non-blood donors of agreeing completely with compensations such as offering
“university credits for students” and “free blood tests”.
Looking at results for the conditional logit model, we observe that same results are obtained
when looking at differences between blood and non-blood donors. The sign of the coefficients
does not change, indicating a more robust estimation when including control variables. We
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observe that those individuals who report having blood and organ donors’ predecessors have a
lower probability of agreeing with “Information” than those who do not have predecessors. This
difference appears to be significant. In addition, there is a difference between men and women
that is significant for some incentives: some reward, fiscal deductions, money, university credits
and blood tests. Men have a higher probability of agreement with those incentives than women.
In general, we observe that the elder a respondent is, the lower the probability of agreeing with
any of the incentives.
The estimation of each of the model allows calculating the probabilities for blood and non-
blood donors of being in each of the level of agreement. This is reflected in the table, down to
the estimation model results.
We now explore the differences in level of agreement/disagreement with each of the incentives
for living organ donations. Results are shown in Table 4.
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Significant differences are found between individuals who state to be completely willing to donate
and those who don’t through the simple ordered logit for the Preference in health care. In that
case individuals who would be completely willing to donate are less likely to agree with that
kind of incentive than those individuals who report a weaker willingness to donate. Including
additional characteristics, the conditional ordered logit detects some significant differences related
to having a donor card and organ donor predecessors among relatives (the probability of agreeing
with monetary payments is lower for individuals who are completely willing to donate), gender
(men are more likely to agree with many incentives than women) and age (the older an individual
is, the lower the probability of agreement with that incentive).
4 Discussion
The economic model for the decision of becoming or not a donor is general for both kinds of
donations considered in this paper (blood and living organ donations). This does not avoid that
the values for the arguments in the utility function differ depending on the decision context is
donating blood or an organ in life: for example, the value for the expected costs will be, in general,
higher when the individual is thinking about donating an organ. We think that the arguments
included describe well the decision making process in the two contexts: there should be a per-se
benefit, an expectation of well-being due to the expected improvement in the recipient, unknown
in the case of blood donations, and possibly very different in magnitude to that of donating an
organ to a relative, and some expectation of costs (in terms of health, time dedicated to the
donation process, or other).
We consider a specific hypothetical situation in which some compensation is offered for do-
nating. Therefore, incentives are also an argument of the utility function, influencing individuals’
final decision. Incentives affect the selfish and altruistic parts of the utility. The total effect of
the incentive over utility depends on the weight that the individual gives to the impact of incen-
tives to the degree of altruism and self-interest. However, as we said before, incentives are one
of many other arguments influencing the final decision. Therefore, even the result of introducing
incentives is negative (a decrease in utility) the individual may decide to become a donor for
other reasons (high per-se benefit, high expectations of improvement for the recipient. . . ).
In the questionnaire we explore the opinion of individuals concerning different incentives.
Individuals had to report their level of agreement/disagreement with each of the incentives
proposed. There were monetary and non-monetary incentives. The incentives are hypothetical,
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so that they were not evaluating real incentives. Responses, therefore, should be interpreted as
how happy an individual would be with each of the incentives, if applied.
Our results are descriptive but could be a clue for policy making. Relating the degree of
agreement and disagreement with incentives to the fact of being a blood/non-blood donor, or
to the degree of willingness to donate an organ, we observe which incentives could be more
attractive for the non-blood donors, and for individuals with a weaker willingness to donate, and
also which incentives would be less attractive to blood donors and to individuals with a stronger
willingness to donate an organ. This information should be contrasted (field experiment), but
could be a clue of which incentives would be more likely to crowd-in new donors and also to
identify the incentives with higher risk of crowding-out donors.
5 Conclusions
Individuals’ decision may be influenced by external interventions. Individuals’ preferences may
not be stable, but may change, essentially depending on the effects of external interventions over
individuals’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
This paper explores how individuals’ behavior, and specifically the decision of becoming or
not a donor, could be influenced by incentives.
The theoretical model analyzes the effect of introducing incentives into the utility function
of impure altruistic individuals. When incentives exist there is always, for altruistic individuals,
a crowding-out effect of offering incentives. However, there can also be a crowding-in effect,
as incentives do not affect only the altruistic part of the utility but also the egoistic part, and
individuals could be attracted somehow by incentives. The difference between these two effects
determines the total effect for each quantity of the incentive offered. The main result, and
contribution, of this model is that each individual has a different willingness to accept a different
compensation, depending on his or her propensity or aversion to receive incentives. A limitation is
that, in practice, it is impossible to individualize the incentives, offering a different compensation
for each individual. However, having knowledge about the willingness to accept in a certain
society, a social planner could use that information to decide which would be the best incentive
in terms of individuals attracted (crowding-in) versus dissuaded (crowding-out).
The questionnaire allows calculating the probabilities of different types of individuals of
agreeing or disagreeing with each kind of the incentives. Concerning blood donations we find that
Crowding-In of non-blood donors becomes more likely if we offer Statistics or Blood tests, while
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Crowding-Out of active blood donors would be more likely if we offer Money, Fiscal Deductions
or Some Reward in general. Concerning living organ donations we do not find good evidence for
Crowding-In. Crowding-Out of individuals who are completely willing to donate could happen
if we offer Money, Fiscal Deductions or Priority in Health Care.
We conclude that donation policies should be focused on non-monetary incentives rather
than on monetary payments as the later imply a higher risk of losing donors.
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